



ONETIZING the debt” conjures up fearsome
images of excessive money stock growth resulting
from Federal Reserve purchases of Treasury debt.
Many analysts fear that debt monetization may pro-
duce undesirable economic consequences, such as
more rapid inflation and, thus, higher nominal inter-
est rates. There appears to be some confusion, how-
ever, overwhat debt monetization means, whether or
to what extent the Federal Reserve has pursued a
policy of debt monetization in the past and what the
best indicator of debt monetization is. ‘these ques-
tions ar’e ofintense interest, with potentially largedef-
icits looming on the horizon that could put increased
pressure on the Federal Reserve to monetize the debt
in the future.
The puipose of this article is to clarif the meaning
ofthe phrase “monetizing the debt” and to determine
whether the Feder-al Reserve has monetized the debt
since 1960. As we will see, the policy objectives of the
monetary authority play an important i-ole in deter-
mining whether’ the Feder-al Reserve will monetize the
debt, We also will show that car-c must be taken not to
confuse debt monetization with growth in the Federal
Reserve’s portfolio ofgovernment debt.
MONETIZING THE DEBT:
WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
In lar’ge measure, the phrase “monetizing the debt”
grew out of the experience of the Federal Reserve im-
mediately after World War It. At the time, the Federal
Reserve had a tacit commitment to the U.S. Treasury to
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stabilize the Treasury’s cost of financing the war’debt.
Afterthewar, individuals began liquidating their’ hold-
ings ofLiberty Bonds. Because of its agreement with
theTreasury, the Federal Reserve purchased substan-
tial amounts ofgovei-nment debt.’
Thesepurchases increased thereserves ofthe bank-
ing system and, consequently, the money stock; the
Federal Reserve was said to havemonetized the debt.
In March 1951, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
reached an accor-dwhereby theFederal Reserve estab-
lished its independence.2 Since then, the Federal Re-
serve has been free to pur’sue its policy objectives
independent of the debt financing needs of the
‘rr’easury?
With the net federal debt (NFDI — total debt minus
holdings of government agencies and tr’usts — at
nearly $1.3 tr-illion arid with historically high deficits,
in both nominal and r’eal terms, there is concern that
the rapidly rising debt will put upward pressur’e on
interest rates, inducing the Federal Reserve to in-
‘The Federal Reserve’s holdings of government debt more than
tripled from 1943 to 1946. See Historical Statistics of the United
States(1975), p.1116.
2See Ahearn (1963), pp. 16—21,
3Actually, at a more abstract level, the question of the independence
of monetary and fiscal policies is open to debate. Sargent and
Wallace (1981) use the governmentbudget constraint to argue that
the monetary authority must ultimately monetizedeficits, This argu-
ment has been challenged recently by Darby (1984), and some
evidence has been supplied recently by Barth, Iden and Russek
(1984). Furthermore, the budget constraint can be used to argue
that the seignorageassociated with Federal Reserveopen market
operations requires a compensatory change in governmentexpend-
itures or taxes. This latter point is discussed in Horrigan (1983). The
seignorageassociated with open market operations is easily illus-
trated from the budget constraint suggested by Thornton (1984).
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crease the monQv supply more rapidly than it other-
wise would or, perhaps, should!
Today, as in the immediate post-World War II pe-
riod, the phrase “monetizing the debt” means money
growth induced by attempts to moder’ate the effects of
rapidlygrowing gover-nment debt on interest rates. By
definition, open mar’ket operations buying and selling
government securities in the money and capital mar-
kets) representdebt monetization, that is, the replace-
ment of government debt with money. Open mar’ket
purchases and debt monetization, therefore are often
taken to be synonymous! This view is enhanced by
the fact that open maiket operations are usually con-
sider-ed the principal tool through which the Federal
Reserve influences the money supply, so that changes
in Federal Reserve policy are likely to be reflected
initially in its portfolio of government debt. For these
reasons, analysts sometimes lookat the growth of the
Federal Reserve’s portfolio of government debt, the
ratio ofthe Federal Reserve’s holdings ofdebt IFHDI to
NFD,or similar measures as indicators ofdebt moneti-
zation. These measures, however, give too little atten-
tion to the goals of policy and the nature of the money
stock mechanism.’
It is clear fr’om our definition that debt monetization
cannot be analyzed separately from the objectives of
Federal Reserve policy. Assume, for example, that the
Feder’al Reserve is targeting money growth to achieve
price level stability. Furthermore, assume that r’eal in-
come is growing at a faster r’ate than velocity so that
money growth mustbe positive. If this money growth
is achieved through open market purchases ofgovern-
ment debt while the debt is simultaneously increas-
ing, the cor’relation between the growth in the Federal
Reserve’s portfolio and government debt gi’owth
would give the falseappearance ofdebt monetization.7
In this example, debt monetization actually occurs
4See Tatom (1984) for a historicalsurvey of the deficit.
‘In principle, any debt can be purchased. In practice, however, the
Federal Reserve primarily purchases marketable debt of the U.S.
Treasury.
‘These measures are singled out here because they are most fre-
quently used in the popular press. Other measures, such as growth
of total reserves or the monetary base, suffer from this same defi-
ciency, as well as some of the deficiencies noted in the following
discussion. See Blinder (1983), Dwyer (1984) and Barth, Sickles
and Wiest (1982) for examples of the various measures that have
been employed in empirical studies of this question.
‘The astute reader will recognize that this implies that open market
purchases of debt are not strictly required for debt monetization to
occur. This can be argued in a number of ways. At a rudimentary
level, assume that the Treasury has the power to print money, so
that deficits can be financed either by issuing debt or, as a substi-
tute, printing money. Printing money directly is as much debt mone-
only ifthe Federal Reserve modifies its primary objec-
tive of price stability because it fears that debt growth
will boost interest rates.
Fur-thermore, in order to claim that the Federal Re-
serve has monetized the debt, one would have to ar-
gue both that ther’e is a positive relationship between
actual or anticipated interest rates and debt growth
and that the Federal Reserve had modified its primary
money stockgrowth objective in response to actual or
perceived upward pressure on interest rates. In this
instance, the association between thedifference inthe
actual and targeted growth rates of money and the
growth of NFD would provide evidence of debt mone-
tization.’ Thus, using thegrowth of Ff10or theratio of
FF10 to NFD alone as indicators of debt monetization
could bemisleading. If the Federal Reserve achieves its
desir’ed money gr’owth objective, it is nor monetizing
the debt, even if money growth is achieved solely
through open market purchases of government debt.
Alternatively, suppose the Federal Reserve’s inter-
mediate policy objective is to peg interest rates at
some desired level.” Then the Federal Reserve mone-
tizes the debt only when changes in the debt, ceteris
paribus, produce changes in interest rates in the same
direction. That is, ifincreases in the debt put upward
pressure on interest rates, the Federal Reserve will
monetize the debt under an interest rate target.
OBSTACLES TO IDENTIFYING DEBT
MONETIZATION
In addition to the need to account for theexplicit or
implicit targets of monetary policy, there is another’
consideration that makes thegrowth of FF10, the ratio
tization as if debt were first issued to finance the deficit, then repur-
chased (later) through note issue.
Of course, the Treasury cannot issue notes directly. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve cannot even purchase government debt directly
from the Treasury. Consequently, all deficits must initially be fi-
nanced through debt issue. This initial debt issue increases the
demand for credit. If this drives interest rates upward, the Federal
Reserve can lessen the effect by increasing the supply of credit,
using any of its policy tools. The long-run effects of Federal Reserve
activities, however, depend on the tool used due topossible wealth
effects and the seignorageassociated with open marketoperations.
See Thornton.
‘Thisdoes not implythat the Federal Reserve hasthe ability to hit its
money target exactly. It requires only that there be a systematic
relationship between these errors and debt growth. The identifica-
tion of this process could be complicated, however, if the uninten-
tional errors are associated directly or indirectly with debt growth.
‘It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which the Federal Reserve
could control interest rates in anything but the short run; neverthe-
less, this is acommon conception of the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy.
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ofFF10 to NFD and similar measures even less reliable
as indicators of debt monetization: money growth
does not necessarily require growth in the Federal
Reserve’sportfolio ofgovernmefl securities. Thus, the
link between debt monetization and the growth of
FF10 may be much weakerthan commonly imagined.
Consider the simple model of money growth,
where the growth of money, rCi, is the sum of the
growth of the money multiplier’, rh, and the growth of
the adjusted monetarybase, E. Ifadjusted basegrowth
were achieved entirely through open market opera-
tions and ifthe multiplier-were constant i.e., mh =
money growth would be equal to the growth in the
Federal Reserve’s portfolio of government debt. If the
multiplier’were rising, however, money growth would
exceed portfolio growth; if the multiplier were falling,
portfolio growth would exceed money growth. There-
fore, the extent towhich the Federal Reserve is mone-
tizing the debt cannot be determined simply ~w ob-
serving the growth rate of the Federal Reserve’s
portfolio of government securities. Multiplier move-
ments must be considered because such movements
weaken the link between portfolio growth and debt
monetization.
Base Growth and Debt Monetization
Other factors affect the link between adjusted base
and portfolio growth and, thereby, make the connec-
tion between debt monetization and the growth of the
Federal Reserve’s portfolio even more tenuous. Even if
the multiplier is constant, the growth rate of money
need not correspond closely with growth in the Fed-
end Reserve’s holdings of government debt.
One of these factors is changes in reserve require-
merits, such as those mandated by theMonetary Con-
trol Act of 1980. These reserve requirement changes
are reflected in the reserve adjustment magnitude
(RAM).” Increases in RAM increase the base, while
reductions reduce it. Consequently, changes in RAM
ma cause the Federal Reserve to buy more or less
government debt than it otherwise would to achieve
its monetary growth objective under a monetary tar-
geting procedur-e.
Adjusted base growth also is affected by other’ fac-
tors, such as depository institution borrowing from
“See Tatom (1980) for a discussion of the adjusted monetary basE
and RAM.
the Federal Reserve and Federal Reserve float.” Secu-
lar movements in these factors can result in adjusted
basegrowth that is faster or slower than thegrowth of
theFederal Reserve’s portfolio. Consequently, data on
the growth rateofthe Federal Reserve’s portfolio isnot
necessarily agood indicator of the extent to which the
Federal Reserve is monetizing the debt.
An Illustration ofThese Relationships
The importance of these factors is illustrated in
charts 1—4. Chart I shows the ratio of FH0 to NF0
annually from 1960 to 1983. This ratio increased from
1960 to 1974 and declined thereafter. Thus, generally
speaking, the Federal Reserve purchased government
securities at amore rapid pacethan thegrowth ofNFD
up to 1974, but at a much slower pace afterwards. tf
this ratio were used as the sole indicator ofdebt mon-
etization, one would likely conclude that the Federal
Reserve monetized the debt from 1960 to 1974, then
reversed this policy.
The same conclusion would emerge if only the
growth r’ate of the Federal Reserve’s portfolio were
considered.” Yet Ml growth was about 4.8 percent
during the former periodand about 7.2 percent during
the latter period. Thus, the growth of money was
slower’in the first period than in the second, despite
the fact that growth of Ff10 was faster in the first
period than in the second, both in absolute terms and
relative to the growth ofNF0.
This inverse i-elation can be explained, in large part,
by movements in the money multiplier, RAM, deposi-
tory institutions’ borrowings and float. These series
are presented in charts 2-4.
The multiplier declined more or less steadily
through 1974. Over- the same period, RAM was fairly
stable, flr’st rising then dropping slightly. Borrowing
wasfairly stable through 1972, then increased dramat-
ically in 1973—74. Float increased modestly through
1972, then declined by about $1 billion during 1973
and 1974. On net, a modest amount of monetary base
was supplied to the banking system fiom 1960 to 1974
through bor-rowings and float, while RAM drained a
modest amount of monetary base from the system
over this period. With the exception of borrowings
during 1973—74, however-, none of these factors was
“There are otherfactors that affect base growth; however, quantita-
tively they are typically less important than those noted.
“The compounded annual rate of growth of FHD was 6.89 percent
from 1974—83, compared with 8.23 percent from 1 g60—74.
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Chart I
Ratio of Federal Reserve Holdings of Federal Debt
to Total Debt
Annuel data
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the decline in the particularly large relative to
multiplier.’’
Consequently, even if the policy objective had been
zero money growth, the Federal Reserve still would
have had to make substantial net open market pur-
chases ofgovernment securities to offset the decline in
the multiplier’.Thus, the increase in the ratio of FF10 to
NF0 might reflect nothing more than the Federal Re-
serve’s need to make purchases of government debt
(to offset multiplier movements) in excess of the
growth of NF0 over this period.
After 1974, a number of factors reduced the Federal
Reserve’s need to engage in open market purchases.
There was asignificant increase in RAM through 1974—
78, followed by an even more dramatic r’ise after the
“For example, the multiplier declined from 3.13 in 1960 to 2.78 in
1974. Given the average level of the adjusted monetary base of
$64.82 billion over this period, the decline in the multiplier had an
impact equivalent toa $7.64 billion drain on the adjusted monetary
base on averageoverthis period.
Monetary Control Act of 1980. At the same time, both
borrowings and float increased dramatically through
1975—79, then declined through 1983. while the multi-
plier- continued to decline through 1980, the rate of
decline was more moderate than before. Since 1980,
the multiplier has remained relativelyunchanged. It is
easyto see how money growth could have accelerated
since 1974 even though the ratio of FF10 to NF0 has
fallen.’4 Thus, the growth of FHD could be used as an
indicator of debt monetization only ifthese other’fac-
tors affecting money remain unchanged.
“No attempt is made here toexplain why thevarious changes in the
multiplier, RAM, the float or borrowings occurred. Nevertheless,
some of these changes can be readily explained. For example, the
increase in borrowings in 1974 was due, in part, to the Federal
Reserve’s efforts to shore up thebanking system after the collapse
of the Franklin National Bank (see the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System 11974], pp. 740—41). Likewise, the signifi-
cant jump in RAM after 1980 can be attributed directly to the Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980, while the significant decline in thefloat after
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Actually, it would be legitimate to use the growth of
the PHD as an indicator of debt monetization if the
Federal Reserve established it as an intermediate pol-
icytarget.Since this has neverbeen done, thepossibil-
ity is not considered here.’3
A Note on the Interest Rate and
Liquidity Effects
The readeris cautionedthat this analysis is an illus-
tration ofdebt monetization under the usual textbook
description of countercylical monetary policy. As
such, it and the empirical analysis that follows are
heavily dependent on the existence oftwo effects that
findlittle support in empirical studies.” The first is the
effect of changes in the government debt on interest
“During the period from October 1979 to October 1982, the Federal
Reserve used nonborrowed reserves as an operating target. Money
growth, however,was its intermediate policy target.
“Forevidence on theliquidity effect, see Brown and Santoni (1983),
Melvin (1983) and the references cited in these articles. For evi-
dence on the relationship between debt growth and interest rates,
see Evans (1984),Blinder and the references cited in Blinder.
rates. The story of debt monetization told above rests
on the idea that increases in debt issue by the Trea-
sury raisethe demand for-credit relativeto thesupply;
consequently, interest rates rise. While it is beyond the
scope of this article to delve into these arguments.
some economists believe, and the bulk of empirical
work suggests, that increases in debt have no effect on
interest rates. If this is true, then increases in debt
would not put pressure on the Federal Reserve to
monetize under any policy regime — unless, of
course, the Federal Reserve believes that debt in-
creases cause interest rates to rise.
The second effect implicit in this analysis is the so-
called liquidity effect, an initial decline in interest
rates associated with an unexpected acceleration in
the growth rate ofmoney. While theliquidity effect has
been isolated empirically, estimates suggest that it is
weak and short-lived. The evidence further’ suggests
that the longer-run effect of acceler’ated money
growth is higher, not lower, nominal rates of interest.
If the Federal Reserve believed this, it would be con-














Reserve Adjustment Magnitude (RAM) and Float
Depository Institutions
Annual data




196061 6263 64 65 666768 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
chart 4
Total Borrowings at Federal Reserve Banks
Annual data








































35FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS DECEMBER 1984
alizing that the longer-run consequences ofits actions
would be higher inflationand highernominal interest
rates.
WHATIS THE EVIDENCE ON DEBT
MONETIZATION?
Ideally, to determine whether the Federal Reserve
has monetized the debt, deviations between actual
and desired monetary targets (say money growth)
should be compared with debt growth. Practical con-
siderations make such a comparison difficult. If the
Federal Reserve established target rates for thegrowth
ofmoney thatwere changed infrequently, the growth
rate of money might represent a useful proxy for the
deviations between actual and desiredmoney growth.
Unfortunately, during most of the post-accord experi-
ence with countercyclical monetary policy, the evi-
dence suggests that the Federal Reserve seldom fo-
cused exclusivelyon amonetary aggregate target.
Instead, the Federal Reserve has given considerable
emphasis to interest rates as the primary intermediate
policy target. Only during the past 15 years has the
Federal Reserve given monetary aggregates much ex-
plicit attention. In January 1970, the Federal Open
Market Committee IFOMC) expressed adesire to place
increased emphasis on the growth of certain mone-
tary aggregates, but explicit targets for the aggregates
were not established until 1975. From October 1979 to
October 1982, the FOMC emphasized the growth of
the monetary aggregates even more; however, the
weight given to the various aggregates changed over
this period. Consequently, it is difficult to find an ex-
tended period overwhich monetary polity objectives
are sufficiently stable to draw strong inferences about
whether the Federal Reserve has monetized the debt.
Despite these difficulties, we provide some evidence,
which should be regarded as descriptive, of the rela-
tionship between money growth and debt growth
during the past two and one-half decades.
The empirical investigation undertaken here differs
from the usual procedure, which is to estimate a“Fed-
eral Reserve reaction function.” The reaction function
isan equation that presumably represents theFederal
Reserve’s response to variables affecting its policy de-
cisions. Studies that have used this type of equation
have produced inconclusive results and suffer from
two problems.”
“Fora moreprecise definition and areview of some of the empirical
literature, see Dwyer. For other reviews ofempirical studies, see
Blinder and Barth, Sicklesand Wiest.
First, many of these studies have used reserve or
basegrowth as the monetary policy variable. Since the
evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve has never
targeted explicitly on these variables, changes in the
growth rates ofthese variables should not be relied on
to provide evidence ofdebt monetization.
Second, these studies include only contemporane-
ous values of both the monetary policy variable and
the measure offederal debt growth. Since these var’ia-
bles are considered only simultaneously, it cannot be
determined whether monetary growth causes debt
growth or vice versa. The causation r-unning from
money to debt is likely because money growth affects
prices, output and nominal interest rates which, in
turn, feed back to debt growth.” Ofcourse, no statisti-
cal procedure can establish causality. There is an eas-
ily implemented procedure, however, which can be
used to test for the temporal ordering of two or more
variables. The procedure is called a test of (iranger
causality.”
The Test Procedure
This test procedure can be illustrated by using the
growth rate ofMand NFD. Let M, and NED, denote the
growth rates of money and the net federal debt, re-
spectively, in the current period and let rCt,, ~
NED,~,NED.,..., denote values of these variables in
previous periods. The test for Gr’anger causality run-
ningfrom rctto NED amounts to regressing the current
value ofNED on pastvalues ofitselfand ra, and testing
the hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the past
values of M are zero. To test that Granger causality
runs from NED to rGt, the current value of r~iis re-
gressed on previous values of itself and NED, and the
hypothesis that the coefficients on the past values of
NED are zero is tested. Ifthe latter hypothesis is re-
jected, while the former is not, then it is said that
growth of the NFD Granger-causes (temporally pre-
cedes) money growth. If the former is rejected, while
the latter isnot, then money growth is said to Granger-
cause ltemporal~precede) growth of the NFD.Ifboth
are rejected, no temporal ordering can be established
li.e., there is feedback between rCt and NED). Ifneither
can be rejected, the series are not temporally related
(i.e., they are said to be independent;.
“See Dewald (1984), Carlson (1984) andfootnote 3.
“Friedmanand Schwartz (1963) were among the first to try to estab-
lish thetemporal ordering between macroeconomic variables. De-
spite its name, it isnow recognized that this procedure is not literally
a testofcausality, nor isit a test ofstatistical exogeneity. See Zellner
(1979) for a discussion of causality, and see Jacobs, Leamer and
Ward (1979) and Wu (1983) for a discussion of the relationship
between Granger causality and statistical exogeneity.
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Tests ofGranger causality were performed over the
l/1960—IV/1983 period using two measures of debt
growth that have been used in the reaction function
literature. The first is the growth of NFD, discussed
earlier. The second is the high-employment budget
deficit (HEBDL”The deficit and changes in the NFD
differ by the so-called off-budget items. These items
are omitted from the official reports of the deficit,
despite the fact they require debt issue.
In addition, the changes in the NFD and the HERD
differ in that the latter is adjusted for cyclical factors,
whiletheformer is not. Consequently. changes in NFD
may misrepresent the pressure to monetize the debt
because they are not cyclically adjusted. In other
words, agiven change in NFD is likely tobe associated
with amuch smaller effect on interest rates ifit occurs
in the contraction rather than the expansion phase of
the cycle.
Furthermore, since a relatively larger portion of
deficits are cyclically induced, these cyclical in-
fluences may be dominant!’ If these cyclically in-
duced changes in debt are not associated with rising
interest rates, there is no pressure to monetize the
debt. Thus, because the cyclical effects have not been
controlled for, there may be no temporal ordering
running from NFD to money. Changes in money
growth, moreover, have been shown to induce cyclical
swings in economic activity, so we should not be sur-
prised to find a strong effect running from money to
income to NFD. To account for the effects ofcyclical
factors, lags of output growth and lags of the inflation
rate are included in some of the tests of Granger cau-
sality!2
The advantage of using the HERD is that it is ad-
justed directly for cyclical factor’s. Ittoo may misrepre-
sent the pressure to monetize the debt, however, be-
cause the off-budget items are omitted. Consequently,
it maybe significantly smaller than theamount ofdebt
‘°The data for HEBDends in 111/1983, so thetests ofGranger causality
involving this variable were performed over this shorter period. Al-
though there are other ways to carryout these tests, work by Ge-
weke, Meese and Dent (1983) and Guilkey and Salemi (1982)
indicate that the procedure used here is preferred.
“See Tatom(1984).
“Lags of past inflation are includedbased on the finding reported by
Blinder and on the workof Horrigan and Protopapadakis (1982) and
others who find that much of the measured deficits are related
directlyto inflation. It could also be argued that the lag from money
growth to inflation is long. Therefore, the lags of past inflation may
simply be a proxy for even longer lagsof money growth.
In addition to NFD, a relatively new measure, the cyclically ad-
justed federal debt calculated by deLeeuw and Holloway (1983),
was used. Thequalitative results with this variable wereunchanged
from those using NFD, so they are not reported here.
issue.23 Furthermore, since the HERD is cyclically ad-
justed, changes in past output should not affect tests
of Granger causality running from money to HERD;
past changes in prices, however, may affect these tests.
Finally, because the question of debt monetization
is tied closely to the policy objectives of the Federal
Reserve, it is important to take account ofthese policy
objectives. Thus, the tests of Granger causality were
conducted over the entire period 111960—tII/1983 and
overthe subperiod ttt/1972—tlI/1983, during which at
least some consideration was given to money stock
objectives.” Because of the shortness of this period, it
was necessary to restrict the search to sixlags on each
variable and to include only three lags of output
growth and inflation.
Empirical Results
The Granger causality tests were performed on
quarterly growth rates of Ml and NFD and on the
quarterly growth rate of Ml and HERD, following a
procedure outlined in Thornton and Batten (1985)?
The significance levels corresponding to the calcu-
lated F-statistics of the Granger tests are reported in
tables 1—B.” The significance levels are presented be-
cause the significance of the F-statistics vary with the
“Forexample, thechange in NFD in fiscal 1983 of$202.8 billionwas
made up ofa $188.8 billionon-budgetdeficit anda$14.0 billion off-
budget deficit. See Economic Repo,tofthe President (1983). Also,
see Allen andSmith (1983).
“The FOMC statedits desireto place increasedemphasis on certain
monetary aggregates at its January 1970 meeting; however, the
estimation period begins in Ill/i 972 to beconservative and to allow
forthe six lags ofboth variables.
“The fact thatthesetests ignorethe question ofwhether changesin
the debtaffect market interestratesis particularly important in inter-
preting the results. If changes in debt have no effect on interest
rates,weshould not expectto find atemporalordering running from
debtgrowth to moneygrowth. If changesin debt have an effect, we
may ormay not find such a temporal ordering. Thus, the lack of a
temporal ordering running from debt to money growth could result
eitherfrom a lack of an interest rate effect orfrom a refusal on the
part of the Federal Reserve to monetizethe debt.
Furthermore, ina rationalexpectationsview, the Federal Reserve
might anticipate the deficit and increase money growth in advance
of the actual increase in the debt. In this case, moneygrowthmight
precede debt growth, but we find no evidence of this temporal
ordering.
“TestsofGrangercausalityshould beconductedwith time seriesthat
are covariance stationary. When the autocorrelation functions of
Ml, NEDand HEBD were investigated,the series appearedstation-
ary. When the Grangercausalitytests were undertaken including a
time trend, however, thetrendvariable wasalwayssignificant at the
5percent level, suggestingthat the series arenot stationary. When
the tests were performed on firstdifferencesofMl, NEDandHEBD,
the time trends were uniformly insignificant. With one exception
noted below, however, these resultswere notqualitatively different
from those usingthe growth rates of Ml and NFD and the level of
HEBD. The latter results are reported because they are easier to
interpret.
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degrees offreedom. The outcomes that are significant
at the 5 percent level are denoted by an asterisk. For’
example, in the regression ofNil on NED in table I the
entry for three lags on each variable is .047. This mdi-
cates that the hypothesis that NED does not Gr’anger--
cause Ml can be i-ejected at the 5 pet-cent significance
level for this lag specification. When the lag length is
increased to four’, however, this hypothesis cannot be
rejected because the entry, .269, is greater’ than .05.
The significance levels based on simple bidirec-
tional tests ofGr’anger causality between KU and NED
and fCll and HERD are presented in tables 1 and 2,
r-espectively. The r’esults in table 1 indicate a str’ong
unidir’ectional effect running from Ku to NED. only
sevenofthe 144 F-tests for the influence of NED on ~li
reported were significant at the 5 per’cent level. None
of these seven lag structures, however, was chosen by
a comnionly used lag-length specification criterion.”
Because NF’D is not cyclically adjusted and is likely to
be affected by changes in r’eal output and prices in-
duced by changes in the money supp~, it is not too
sur’pr’isingthat the teniporal or’dering runs fi’onl Ml to
NED.”
“The lag-length selection criterion used here is the final prediction
error. See Thornton and Batten,and Batten and Thornton (1984).
“It is somewhat surprising, however, that the same qualitative result
is obtained for the cyclically adjusteddebt measure. This suggests
the possibilitythatthis cyclicallyadjusted measuredoesnot capture
all the effects ofpast output and pricelevel growth. This conjecture
is supported by the fact that the significance levels are greatly
increased when three lags ofoutput growth and inflation were in-
cluded in thesespecifications. In anyevent, thereis no evidenceof a
temporal orderingrunning fromcyclically adjusted debt to money.
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The results in table 2 for the HERD, however, mdi-
cate unidirectional causality running from HERD to
Ml. The hypothesis that HERD has no impact on Ml
was rejected for nearly every lag specification consid-
ered, while the hypothesis that r~tlhas no effect on
HERD wasnever r’ejected. Thus, this measure suggests
that money gr’owth responds to cyclically adjusted
changes in the debt.
The Granger Tests Extendedfor
Cyclical Influences
In the simple tests of bivariate Granger causality
pr’esented above, the observed feedback between
money growth and NED or’ the causality running from
HERD to K41 could be the result ofthe close associa-
tion between these variables and factors not ac-
counted forby the equation. In order toguard against
this possibility, the tests were repeated adding three
and then six lags of the growth rates ofprices and real
output as additional variables.”
The results for the equations with six lags are pre-
sented in tables 3 and 4. The results in table S indicate
“The possibility that money growth responds to either past output
growth or inflation can be argued two ways. First, such variables
couldrepresenta FederalReserve reaction function response, e.g.,
high past rates of inflation oroutput growth inducethe Fed to slow
the rate ofMl growth.Second, themoney supply couldbe endoge-
nous (at leastovershort periods oftimelike aquarter), i.e., relatedto
othervariables in the system like interest rates.Sinceinterest rates
are positivelyrelated to both inflationand output growth, the money
stock should move with these variables. If the second case were
correct, there should be a positive relationship between past infIa-
tion and money growth; however, Blinder reportsa negative rela-
tionship. Wefind the same result, although it is not reported here.
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that Ml and NED ar-c independent series. There rn-c
just seven instances wher’e the F-tests of NEI) on ~11
ar’e significant, and none of these were selected by the
lag-length specification criterion.” Thus, once output
growth and inflation are accounted fo,-, ther-e is virtu-
ally no evidence of a separate effect of money growth
on debt growth and no evidence ofcausality from NED
to Ml.
The results in table 4 are similar to those in table 2,
in that ~Il has no effect on HERD, while HERD con-
tinues to Granger-cause r~ll. A comparison of tables 2
and 4, however, shows that the significance levels for
“When first differencesof growth rates are used, there is no areaof
the lag space where the hypothesis can be rejected.
the tests of the effect r’unning fi-om HERD to Ml ar-c
substantially larger when gr’owth r-ates of output and
pr-ices are accounted for. Nevertheless, the HERD pro-
tides some evidence of debt monetization not evident
when NED is used.
Resultsfor Ill/i 972 —IV/i983
The results for the 111/1972—111/1983 period> in which
more emphasis was placed on the monetary aggre-
gates, ar’e reported in tables S and 6. UnIv the results
with lags of inflation and output gr’owth are re-
ported.l” These results indicate that, over this period,
“When no lags of inflation and output growth are used, the results
indicate unidirectional causality running from Ml to NFD andinde-
pendence between Ml and HEBD.
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Ku is independent of both NED and the HERD. There
was no por-tion of the lag space consider’ed in which
the hypotheses constituting the Granger’ tests could
he rejected. Hence, ther-e is no evidence ofdebt mone-
tization ovet- this per-iod for’ either’ measure of debt
growth. Thus, the HERD result, which indicates that
the Federal Reserve had monetized the debt over the
1960—83 period, appear’s to result from the Feder’al
Reserve’s interest rate tar-get procedures over nearly
the first half of the period — a period when debt
monetization is mor’e likely to be an inherent result of
attempts to influence inter’est rates. Aninvestigation of
a period forwhich it is more relevant toconsider the
question of debt monetization yields no evidence that
the Feder’al Reserve has monetized the debt.
The pur-pose ofthis article was toclear up confusion
that often char’acterizes discussions ofdebt monetiza-
tion and to provide some evidence on the question of
whether the Federal Reserve has monetized the debt.
Specifically, itwas pointed out that the phrase mone-
tizing the debt” means money growth in excess ofthat
required to achieve some policy objective that is in-
duced by rapid growth in the federal debt.
It was noted that the r’atio of Federal Reserve debt
holdings to net federal debt, or other such measures,
cannot be used alone as evidence of debt monetiza-
tion. Changes in the money multiplier’ and factor’s that
affect components of themonetary base will influence
CONCLUSIONS
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the growth of theFederal Reserve’s portfolio ofgovern-
ment securities for any given policy objective in ways
that confound attempts to determine the extent of
debt monetization taking place.
‘Two commonly used measures of debt growth, the
growth of net federal debt and the high-employment
budget deficit, were used to test whether money
growth precedes debt growth, or vice versa. The
results for the tlt/1972—IV/1983 period, during which
the Federal Reserve placed more emphasis on the
monetan1 aggregates than it had in previous years,
shows no evidence of debt monetization by the Fed-
eral Reserve using either debt measure. For the entire
1960—83 period, there is evidence of debt monetization
for the high-employment deficit measure, but not for
growth of the net federal debt. Thus, the only evidence
of debt monetization occurs during the period of in-
terest rate targeting, when debt monetization is to be
expected if increases in the federal debt put upwar’d
pressure on interest rates.
The reader is cautioned, however, in that actual
money growth, rather than deviations of actual from
desired money growth, was used in these tests. Since
the debt monetization has to do with movements
away from policy objectives induced by actual or per-
ceived pressure ofrapid debt growth on interest rates,
the critical implicit assumption here, and inmost pre-
vious studies of debt monetization, is that actual
changes in money growth proxy such movements.
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